There have been a wide variety of reports suggesting that ntscmp.com is being filtered in Hong Kong. Global Voices has a great round-up of the discussion. It is clear from the discussion that users are reporting various results, some are able to access the site others are not.
ntscmp.com is hosted on a web hosting company in the U.S. Its IP address is 69.49.101.19 [reverse DNS - hostedc10.megawebservers.com] and at least 5,439 other domain names are also hosted on that IP address.
I issued traceroute requests from 7 different locations in Hong King (different AS numbers). None of the 7 were able to sucecssfully reach the IP address, but the last hop for all was outside of Hong Kong.
Unfortunetly, I was not able to test on PCCW (the biggest telecom in HK and ISP netvigator) -- the for which there is speculation as to a political motive for the blocking -- but the fact that there is inaccessiblity on other unrelated ISP's and that this is a result of something happeneing upstream it is unlikely that filtering is occuring, rather there are various network errors occuring.
If filtering is occuring (perhaps by upstream providers) it could be targetting one of the other 5,439 hosted on that same server. At this point there does not seem to be evidence of targeted filtering by Hong Kong ISP's.
Friday, September 22, 2006
Monday, September 18, 2006
ISP's vs. the State
The recent CRTC/Warman case has generated much discussion. One of the issues brought forward is that this case sought to have the CRTC authorize ISP's to voluntarily block sites, something that distinguishes this from government-mandated censorship. While true, it rasises several issues.
Firstly, it is not neccessarily a positive thing. ISP's have engaged in misguided vigilantism in the past, blocking content the ISP feels it is entitled to block (and doing so in a manner that blocked nearly 800 non-related sites in order to block just one site). ISP's are not equipped or qualified to make judgements on content and will always default to the lowest common denominator which has serious repercussion on freedom of speech and expression. Putting "the issue in the hands of ISPs" is not necessarily a better option than state censorship.
Secondly, as the case of China illustrates, the government will often authorize certain topics to be censored leaving the decision on what is specifically blocked to private firms. As the N.Y. Times reported:
Domestic Chinese blog providers in China have told me how they create lists of what terms to filter themselves. Governments delegate responsibilty for censorsing to ISP's and ICP's (content providers). Often, ISP's will become very conservative, blocking more than they are required to block. In Iran, the ISP ParsOnline is known for block more content than required by the government.
Thirdly, the filtering systems in use to block child pornography also suffer from serious problems. In addition to the fact that filtering does not contribute to the removal of child pornography from the Internet and does not contribute to the arrest and prosecution of criminals who traffic in this material it is also easily circumvented. At best, it prevents casual or inadvertent access to designated websites. (Websites are not neccessarily the most common way this material is transmitted, p2p systems for example are unaffected by this type of filtering). Also, there is often no review process (once on the list always on the list) or appeals process (if content is removed or a mistake made). And although the technology is getting better there is often significant over blocking -- blocking content that was never intended to be blocked in the first place.
For example, a Pennsylvania state law that required ISP to block access to web sites suspected of hosting child pornography violated the First Amendment, according to the Federal District Court in Philadelphia. The ruling details the process, both legal and technical, that lead to the blocking of 1.5 million legitimate websites while trying to block access to approximately 400 websites suspected of containing child abuse images.
The protection of children, the elimination of child pornography and combatting hate speech are extremely important concerns. Actions taken to fight the production and dissemination of child pornography and hate speech should be designed to be effective while not impinging on the free speech rights of citizens or placing the responsibility to determine offending content on Internet Service Providers (ISP). To combat child pornography on the Internet, government, law enforcement the ISP/web hosting industry and civil society organizations must come together to work collectively on this serious problem.
Firstly, it is not neccessarily a positive thing. ISP's have engaged in misguided vigilantism in the past, blocking content the ISP feels it is entitled to block (and doing so in a manner that blocked nearly 800 non-related sites in order to block just one site). ISP's are not equipped or qualified to make judgements on content and will always default to the lowest common denominator which has serious repercussion on freedom of speech and expression. Putting "the issue in the hands of ISPs" is not necessarily a better option than state censorship.
Secondly, as the case of China illustrates, the government will often authorize certain topics to be censored leaving the decision on what is specifically blocked to private firms. As the N.Y. Times reported:
American Internet firms typically arrive in China expecting the government to hand them an official blacklist of sites and words they must censor. They quickly discover that no master list exists. Instead, the government simply insists the firms interpret the vague regulations themselves.
Domestic Chinese blog providers in China have told me how they create lists of what terms to filter themselves. Governments delegate responsibilty for censorsing to ISP's and ICP's (content providers). Often, ISP's will become very conservative, blocking more than they are required to block. In Iran, the ISP ParsOnline is known for block more content than required by the government.
Thirdly, the filtering systems in use to block child pornography also suffer from serious problems. In addition to the fact that filtering does not contribute to the removal of child pornography from the Internet and does not contribute to the arrest and prosecution of criminals who traffic in this material it is also easily circumvented. At best, it prevents casual or inadvertent access to designated websites. (Websites are not neccessarily the most common way this material is transmitted, p2p systems for example are unaffected by this type of filtering). Also, there is often no review process (once on the list always on the list) or appeals process (if content is removed or a mistake made). And although the technology is getting better there is often significant over blocking -- blocking content that was never intended to be blocked in the first place.
For example, a Pennsylvania state law that required ISP to block access to web sites suspected of hosting child pornography violated the First Amendment, according to the Federal District Court in Philadelphia. The ruling details the process, both legal and technical, that lead to the blocking of 1.5 million legitimate websites while trying to block access to approximately 400 websites suspected of containing child abuse images.
The protection of children, the elimination of child pornography and combatting hate speech are extremely important concerns. Actions taken to fight the production and dissemination of child pornography and hate speech should be designed to be effective while not impinging on the free speech rights of citizens or placing the responsibility to determine offending content on Internet Service Providers (ISP). To combat child pornography on the Internet, government, law enforcement the ISP/web hosting industry and civil society organizations must come together to work collectively on this serious problem.
Wednesday, September 6, 2006
CRTC asked to block websites
[UPDATE: The CRTC has denied Warman's claim. The CRTC documents are available here. ]
The Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC) is being asked to authorize ISP's in Canada to block web sites:
Canadian ISP, Telus, blocked access to a Union related website during a labour dispute in the past without CRTC authorization. But there have been increasing moves to push for a formalized system through which ISP can block websites. Currently the focus is on hate sites and child pornography as is usually the case when arguments are made to introduce national filtering systems.
The actual issue appears to be the posting of death threats against Richard Warman posted on neo-nazi sites (one of which was hosted on Blogspot and has been removed). Mr. Warman should pursue his legal options in this matter but this should not be used as a trojan to introduce blanket filering (which does not remove the death threats or really prevent anyone from getting access to them or facilitate the criminal prosecution of the accused). The case appears to be more about "precedence" than it is about the death threats against Warman and I'm particularly troubled by this quote from Warman:
Making ISP's liable for content is not the right thing to do, not for copyright or hate speech. Giving ISP's permission to voluntarily block web sites is also dangerous. As has been shown with copyright, ISP are not equipped or qualified to make judgments on content and will always default to the lowest common denominator which has serious repercussion on freedom of speech and expression.
There's a great discussion on this at http://www.digital-copyright.ca/.
The Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC) is being asked to authorize ISP's in Canada to block web sites:
One of two U.S.-based hate websites was taken offline Wednesday as an Ottawa lawyer and a Jewish lobby group asked Canada's telecommunications regulator to take the unprecedented step of blocking access to the sites from north of the border.
Canadian ISP, Telus, blocked access to a Union related website during a labour dispute in the past without CRTC authorization. But there have been increasing moves to push for a formalized system through which ISP can block websites. Currently the focus is on hate sites and child pornography as is usually the case when arguments are made to introduce national filtering systems.
The actual issue appears to be the posting of death threats against Richard Warman posted on neo-nazi sites (one of which was hosted on Blogspot and has been removed). Mr. Warman should pursue his legal options in this matter but this should not be used as a trojan to introduce blanket filering (which does not remove the death threats or really prevent anyone from getting access to them or facilitate the criminal prosecution of the accused). The case appears to be more about "precedence" than it is about the death threats against Warman and I'm particularly troubled by this quote from Warman:
Internet providers that don't block the sites may make themselves legally liable if a user acts on what they read online, Warman suggested.
Making ISP's liable for content is not the right thing to do, not for copyright or hate speech. Giving ISP's permission to voluntarily block web sites is also dangerous. As has been shown with copyright, ISP are not equipped or qualified to make judgments on content and will always default to the lowest common denominator which has serious repercussion on freedom of speech and expression.
There's a great discussion on this at http://www.digital-copyright.ca/.
NY Times Geolocation Filtering
The NY Times (mirror) recently restricted access to articles on the recent terrorism case in Britain for users in the UK. Although users could see the headline if the link was clicked the following message was shown:
Filtering content by geographic location is nothing new and its use is now becoming widespread.
“On advice of legal counsel, this article is unavailable to readers of nytimes.com in Britain,” is the message they would have seen. “This arises from the requirement in British law that prohibits publication of prejudicial information about the defendants prior to trial.”
Filtering content by geographic location is nothing new and its use is now becoming widespread.
Jonathan Zittrain, a professor of Internet governance and regulation at Oxford University, said restricting information fit with trends across the Internet. “There’s a been a sense that technology can create a form of geographic zoning on the Internet for many years now — that they might not be 100 percent effective, but effective enough,” Mr. Zittrain said. “And there’s even a sense that international courts might be willing to take into account these efforts.
Sunday, September 3, 2006
Media Monitoring
AP reports:
A related article in Rolling Stone details Rendon's involvement in similar info-ops:
The U.S. command in Baghdad is seeking bidders for a two-year, $20 million public relations contract that calls for monitoring the tone of Iraq news stories filed by U.S. and foreign media...
The military last year was criticized for a public relations program in Iraq that included hiring a consulting firm that paid Iraqi news media to carry news stories written by American troops.
Pentagon officials have defended the program as a necessary tool in the war on terror. But critics have said it contradicts American values of freedom of the press.
A related article in Rolling Stone details Rendon's involvement in similar info-ops:
According to the Pentagon documents, the Rendon Group played a major role in the IOTF. The company was charged with creating an "Information War Room" to monitor worldwide news reports at lightning speed and respond almost instantly with counterpropaganda.
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