Friday, June 19, 2009

Iran DDOS 2

I just read a great post by Jose Nazario suggesting that there hasn't been much evidence of the use of botnets. But the most interesting point he makes is where he points out that the site under attack could take offensive action against the people participating in these "refresh" style attacks:

The attackers who participate by loading these pages and going off to dinner, sleep, or on with their days open themselves up to attacks back through drive-by attacks. Imagine a simple scenario: the victims modify their sites to include some code like LuckySploit that commits a simple set of attacks. The attacker’s machine reloads the page (this is, after all, part of the attack). Hit a browser or accessory bug and bam, the attacker has been attacked. Now you’ve got a foothold on the attacker’s machine and, if you’re a sophisticated cyberwar player, you can use this to further understand your adversary. This is a dangerous strategy. If you’re going to employ this kind of attack you need to remember you may be putting your “army” at risk.


That's interesting because it has happened before. A similar type of campaign back in 1998 by EDT was focused on the Pentagon and the site under attack retaliated:

In September 1998, the Electronic Disturbance Theater, a group of activists that practices politically driven cyber civil-disobedience, launched an attack aimed at disabling a Pentagon Web site by flooding it with requests. The Pentagon responded by redirecting the requests to a Java applet programmed to issue a counteroffensive. The applet flooded the browsers used to launch the attack with graphics and messages, causing them to crash.


(Also, the defacers are getting into it: A gov.ir site was defaced too (http://www.marivan.gov.ir/Election.htm))

Tuesday, June 16, 2009

Iran DDOS

There have been a variety of good reports (zdnet, sans, fp ) on the DDOS campaigns targeting Iranian sites after the election. However, one of the things I've noticed is the tendency to characterize this as something relatively new. But this has been happening for at least a decade! See, http://www.fraw.org.uk/download/ehippies/archive/op-01.html , http://www.fraw.org.uk/download/ehippies/archive/op-01a.html, http://www.thing.net/~rdom/ecd/archives.html

I think that one of the issues that's being overlooked is the mobilization and participation component. To just DDOS a site its easier to use/buy/rent/etc... a botnet. That involved few people, it is easy, and its is effective. To get a bunch of people to basically refresh a site (even if they are using some rudimentary automated tools) requires participation. I have doubts about whether the downtime of the targeted sites is due to this type of attack. I suspect that there are likely other attacks involved that do the heavy lifting.

"But to think that it takes a lot of people to execute an act of civil disobedience on the Internet is naiive. Programs make a difference, not people." -- Oxblood Ruffin, cDc

Anyway, I'm finding that these sites are unavailable:


16/06/09 12:18 http://ahmadinejad.ir/ 217.218.155.110 503
16/06/09 12:18 http://www.justice.ir/ 62.193.12.10 503
16/06/09 12:18 http://www.iranjudiciary.org/ 62.18.21.156 (51, 'Network is unreachable')
16/06/09 12:18 http://rajanews.com/ 10.7.222.162 (51, 'Network is unreachable')
16/06/09 12:18 http://www.farsnews.com/ 77.104.73.15 (61, 'Connection refused')
16/06/09 12:18 http://www.leader.ir/ 62.220.121.130 (61, 'Connection refused')
16/06/09 12:18 http://www.president.ir/ 80.191.69.11 timed out
16/06/09 12:18 http://www1.farsnews.com 77.104.73.16 timed out
16/06/09 12:18 http://www.irna.ir/ 81.12.51.146 timed out
16/06/09 12:18 http://www.police.ir/ 81.28.32.52 timed out
16/06/09 12:18 http://www.mfa.gov.ir/ 217.172.99.41 timed out


The defacers seem to be out too:
http://zone-h.org/mirror/id/9003285